Abstract-We consider the problem of identifying insiderbased attacks in the form of jammers in multi-channel wireless networks, where jammers have the inside knowledge of frequency hopping patterns and any protocols used in the wireless network. We propose a novel technique, called "alibi", to identify the insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Starting from such simple concept, we develop an alibi framework to cope with insider-based jamming attackers in various situations including single/multiple jammer and lossy channels. We evaluate the framework according to several properties such as accuracy, detection time and network performance via TOSSIM simulation and analysis. The overall results of these protocols show a promising research direction to deal with insider-based jamming attacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to jamming attacks due to the open and shared nature of wireless medium. In the jamming attack, an attacker injects a high level of noise into the wireless system which significantly reduces the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) and probability of successful message receptions.
While there are various ways to carry out jamming attacks (cf. see Section VII), we consider a so-called insider-based jamming attack as follows. In an insider-based jamming attack, there are several nodes getting compromised either before the deployment or during the operation of the network. These compromised nodes are used to jam the network. The dangers of this type of attacks are two-fold. First, the attackers have shared knowledge that is supposed to remain secret within the network such as shared keys, shared hopping pattern and/or any protocols used by the network. Second, the attackers can be very stealthy if they want to stay undetected for long time and do further damage to the network. The stealthy nature of the attack also helps the attackers to conserve the energy if the devices are powered by batteries.
Most of the work in the jamming defense literature can only deal with outsider-based jamming attacks (cf. see Section VII). By "outsider", we mean the attackers with zero knowledge of any shared secrets among nodes in the network. One of the most effective ways to prevent such an outsider jammer is spread spectrum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency (frequency-hopping spread spectrum -FHSS) or spreading its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum -DSSS), the network can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than if spread spectrum were not used [1] . However, spread spectrum does not work if the attacker knows the hopping-pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN) sequence of DSSS. An insider-based jammer can easily obtain the shared hopping pattern of the network and jam very effectively. Thus, dealing with insider-based attackers is far more challenging than the outsider-based ones.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of identifying the insider-based jammers. Note that there is a difference between detection and identification. Detection is a weaker concept than identification. Detection only means that a jammer exists. Identification means that a specific node is the jammer. We propose a novel technique, called "alibi", to identify insiderbased jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. By definition, "alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed". In the context of jamming attacks, honest nodes try to obtain alibis showing that they were doing legitimate actions observed by some witnesses while the jamming action took place. From this core concept of alibi, we develop a framework, called alibi framework, to identify insider-based jammers. The key principle in building the alibi framework is that there has to be a significant difference in the way of obtaining alibis between honest nodes and attackers. For example, alibis can be defined in the way that only honest nodes can obtain alibis while attackers cannot obtain any alibis. In this way, when all honest nodes obtain at least one alibi, attackers are identified.
Even though alibi framework starts from a simple concept, there are numerous challenges to make it work in the context of identifying insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. First, because there is no clear distinction between a "normal-corrupted" packet (i.e. a packet corrupted by an unintentional collision) and a jammed packet (i.e. a packet corrupted by an intentional jamming action), we have to deal with "false" alibis. False alibis are alibis that can be falsely generated from mis-identified packet corruption events. Thus, attackers can exploit this fact to get false alibis and stay undetected. Second, alibi is susceptible to slander attacks. In a slander attack, if the behaviors of honest nodes are completely known by the attackers, the attackers can deterministically avoid committing jamming actions whenever those honest nodes may potentially obtain alibis. By doing this strategy, the victim nodes will never be able to obtain any alibis and thus become as mis-identified as attackers. Third, there might be multiple attackers in the network. A jam event caused by one attacker can help another attacker to get an alibi. Lastly, alibi framework has to be able to cope with these challenges without much performance degradation of the network.
In our previous work [2] , we only deal with the case of a single insider-based jammer in a single-hop wireless network -the simplest case of a challenging problem. In this paper, we will deal with the case of single/multiple attackers in multichannel wireless networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with the system model including network model, jammer model and problem formulation in Section II. We present the general alibi framework including the basic ideas and desired properties for any alibi-based protocols in Section III. We then give the analysis of alibi in Section IV. We evaluate the framework in Section VI. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

Network Model:
We consider a multi-hop multi-channel ad hoc networks as shown in Figure 1 . Several nodes are compromised and become insider-based jammers. Each jammer can affect at least one victim node in the network, i.e. the attacker can disrupt any packet reception at victim nodes. Each node is equipped with a single transceiver. That means, a node cannot send and receive simultaneously (i.e. half-duplex). There will be also non-negligible transmit-toreceive and receive-to-transmit turn-around time. The channel switching delay of a node is also assumed to be non-negligible.
Nodes in the network have a set orthogonal channels C = {c 1 , ...c |C| } that they can switch to. They use a multichannel MAC protocol such as Slotted Seeded Channel Hopping (SSCH) [3] or McMAC [4] . The main reasons for the suggestion of these multi-channel MAC protocols are: 1) They improve the capacity of the wireless networks. They generally do not require any special hardware other than a commodity wireless cards (e.g. 802.11). 2) They are multiple-rendezvous protocols in which multiple device pairs can make agreements simultaneously on distinct channels [4] . This eliminates the problem of single control channel bottleneck -a sweet spot for the jammer to target on. This is very important because a jammed control channel may drastically reduce the effective throughput close to zero [5] [6]. Jamming Model: A packet consists of a set of symbols. A jammed packet has several corrupted symbols whose locations are unknown. However, the corruption of a packet can be detected by checking its cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Corrupted packets, due to either jamming or unintentional interference, are still delivered to the upper layer to provide information on reasons of corruption [7] . We assume that any two receivers listening on the same channel at the same time will receive the same packet content with probability p r , regardless whether the packet is corrupted or not. However, for the sake of simplicity of our analysis, we assume p r = 1.
Jammer Model: The jammer uses reactive jamming strategy [8] . It will start sending a packet whenever it senses a preamble signal from any senders. The jammer is assumed not to leave any trivial information to trace it back such as its MAC address. The jammer is assumed to be able to jam multiple channels by doing channel switching. That means, a jammer may jam one channel, which takes him sometime to corrupt few symbols, and switch to another channel to do jamming. However, we assume within a time slot s, jammers cannot jam all channels. This is a necessary condition for any in-band anti-jamming defenses. Otherwise, no in-band communication is possible and thus no in-band jamming defense is possible.
Detection Model: We assume there is a trusted entity G (e.g. a base station) where nodes can report to. We also assume that when necessary, nodes can have a secure communication to G by using either public/private key or pre-shared key.
Problem Formulation: Consider the network of nodes that are directly affected by the jammers. The affected nodes are those that have high packet error rates (PER). This is similar to the jammed-area mapping service proposed in [9] . These jammed nodes and their direct neighbors are put into a suspect list. Let us denote N the set of suspect jamming nodes and n = |N |. For example, for the network topology shown in Figure 1 , node 1 to node 9 are put into suspect list, i.e. n = 9. The problem is to find out all jammers in the suspect list.
III. ALIBI'S FRAMEWORK
A. Alibi
Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. The alibi framework is built up from this core concept. Our alibi definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Alibi & Defendant). An alibi for a defendant is a proof including time and channel information which shows that the defendant was doing legitimate actions at the time the jamming action was committed. A legitimate action is either sending or receiving a packet.
Definition 2 (Proof & Witness). A witness is a node showing proofs of a defendant doing an action at a specific time.
In our alibi framework, a defendant cannot claim an alibi by itself. Rather, alibis for defendants are generated from proofs collected by witnesses. Thus, more number of witnesses for an alibi also increases the trustworthiness of that alibi.
From Def. 1, there are two types of alibis: sending-based alibis and receiving-based alibis.
Definition 3 (Sending-based alibi (S-alibi)). A sending-based alibi for a node shows that the defendant was observed, by several witnesses, sending an uncorrupted packet over one whole time slot in one channel at the time the jamming action took place in another channel.
This definition exploits the fact that a jammer cannot jam one channel and send an uncorrupted packet of one time slot in another channel simultaneously.
Definition 4 (Receiving-based alibi (R-alibi)). A receivingbased alibi for a node shows that the defendant 1) was receiving a jammed packet, by showing a (hashed) packet content that matches with the (hashed) packet content received by other witnesses or 2) was receiving an uncorrupted packet by showing a correct CRC check.
This definition exploits half-duplex nature of the jammer: it cannot both send and receive a packet simultaneously. In the receiving-based alibis, an R-defendant of a jamming event is 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE also an R-witness of other R-defendants of the same event. Simply said, a node that can show that it was receiving a corrupted packet or uncorrupted packet while there was a jamming event will get an R-alibi.
B. The principle in using alibis to identify attackers
The key principle in using alibis to identify attackers is that there has to be significant difference of alibis obtained by good nodes and attackers. The difference can be deterministic such as "only good nodes can obtain alibi while attackers cannot" or statistical such as "a good node statistically obtains higher number of alibis than an attacker". With these differences, as time goes on, the attackers will be eventually identified. If attackers can manage to remove the differences, the alibi framework will fail to differentiate the good nodes and the attackers. Thus, it is very important to have the right definition and implementation of alibis.
C. Slander attacks
If the behaviors of defendants are deterministic, attackers can do slander attacks on any victim nodes as follows. Whenever victim nodes become defendants, the attackers will not commit any jamming actions. By doing this, the victim nodes cannot obtain any alibis and thus have no difference with the attackers. This violates the principle of the alibi framework. Thus, to avoid slander attackers, we have to introduce randomness into defendants' behaviors. However, because the defendants in S-alibis have to actually send packets to obtain alibis, introducing randomness in their behaviors also introduce additional collisions in the network. The collisions not only degrade the network performance but also cause additional "false" alibis because collisions can be considered as "unintentional" jamming actions. This is not a problem for defendants in R-alibis as they only have to listen to channels. Thus, even though there might be ways to mitigate the problem of S-alibis to cope with slander attacks, we will only discuss R-alibis in this work due to its advantage in dealing with slander attacks. Thus, alibis refer to R-alibis from now on, unless specified.
D. Alibi protocol
When an honest node is idle in any time slots (i.e. no sending or receiving), it switches to a uniformly random channel in Γ with probability p w to become an R-witness (also R-defendant). For a node, increasing p w will increase the probability of being R-witness and potentially increase the probability of getting alibis but also decrease its network performance. For example, if a node always has a packet to send, p w = 0.2 means it will lose 20% of its either sending or receiving capabilities. Thus, p w can be used as a parameter to control the trade-off between the probability of getting alibis and the degradation of the network performance.
When a node N i becomes a R-witness in a time slot t on channel c, it will receive the whole packet content p regardless of whether the packet is decodable or not. It will get the hashed content of the received packet by using any good hash function H (e.g. CRC, SHA1 or MD5) and create a proof m sent to G in the form of (t, c, H(p)), which is then encrypted and sent to G. The central trusted detector G collects proofs m and generates alibis for each node in the network according to R-alibi definitions. It maintains an "alibi score" for each node. Specifically, whenever a group of nodes show the matching proofs, G will increase the alibi score of every node in that group by 1. When the alibi score of a node is too low compared to other nodes (see Section III-E), it will be accused as attackers. Figure 2 gives an example of how the alibi works for nodes in the jammed region. (a) Node 2's message is jammed by node 1. Node 3 and 6 get an alibi. (c) Node 4's message is jammed by node 1. Node 3 and 5 get alibis. Fig. 2 . An example of the alibi scheme: Node 1 is the jammer and cannot obtain any alibis while the rest of nodes eventually can get at least one alibi.
E. Distance-based Outlier Detection Algorithms
Given a set of alibi scores ascore r (T ), ∀r ∈ N calculated over the time slot set T , we need to identify the set of nodes with the alibi scores that are too low compared to other nodes. Because we do not know the distribution of the alibi scores, the outlier detection algorithm has to be non-parametric. In the alibi framework, we use a distance-based outlier detection technique as follows.
Denote μ, σ the mean and standard deviation of ascore r (T ), respectively. A node r is determined as outlier if its distance to the "center" (i.e., μ) is larger than a predetermined threshold ξ. We use the Mahalanobis squared distance calculated as d(r) = (ascore r − μ) 2 σ −1 . Mahalanobis squared distance d(i) is used rather than Euclidian distance because Mahalanobis distance normalizes the original distances into the scale-invariant distances that can be compared to the χ 2 distribution. Specifically, Mahalanobis distance has a property that the probability of d(i) > χ 2 (γ) is γ, where χ 2 (γ) is the upper (100γ)-th percentile of a chi-square distribution. A node r is accused as an attacker if d(r) < μ and d(r) ≥ ξ. The first condition ensures that we only accuse nodes that have alibi scores lower than the mean μ. The second condition specifies the threshold ξ in which r is accused based on its distance d(r). Intuitively, lower value of ξ increases the detection probability (i.e., accusing r when r is an attacker), but also increases the false alarm probability (i.e., accusing r when r is an honest node). In the alibi framework, ξ is chosen based on the target false alarm probability γ. Specifically, ξ = χ 2 (γ). For example, if the target false alarm probability γ is 0.1, ξ is set to χ 2 (0.1) = 2.706.
F. Jamming-resistant communication for proof-exchange
To make the proof-exchange protocol jamming-resistant, we use a similar technique in the UFH system [10] . During the proof-exchange period, honest nodes randomly pick a channel from C in each time slot. Note that nodes still use CSMA/CA to send proof packets to reduce collisions. When getting acknowledged from G for a proof packet, a node moves on to the next proof packet. The purpose of the random selection of the channel during the proof-exchange period is to make it harder for the attackers to jam. More importantly, it will prevent the jammers to perform slander attacks on any node because the sending pattern is random and unknown to the attackers. However, because the schedule of G is known to the attackers, it is still possible that attackers specifically target the jamming attacks on node G to block any possible communication to G. To avoid this situation, node G has to 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE randomize its schedule as well. Specifically, node G starts its proof-exchange period in which it will randomize its schedule under two conditions: 1) it receives a significant number of corrupted packets and 2) it receives a significant number of distinct nodes sending proof packets to it. The first condition covers the situation where node G is under jamming attack. The second condition covers the situation where the jamming attackers target all other nodes but node G so that G does not start the proof-exchange mode. Both conditions involve thresholds which are system parameters. When switching to proof-exchange period, node G will randomly pick a channel in each time slot. Furthermore, it will only stay in the receiving mode until it can identify the jammers.
IV. DEALING WITH NON-COLLUDING ATTACKERS
In this section, we give the analysis of the case of the noncolluding attackers under the basic alibi protocol proposed in Section III-D. The analysis for the case of single attacker can be found in [2] . Note that in this analysis, we assume a lossless channel condition. 
Lemma 1 (Identifying non-colluding attackers). In the network N with the set of k non-colluding jammers
, where p witness rmin is the minimum probability of being witness of all honest nodes in the network,
|C| )
Proof : Please see our technical report [11] .
V. DEALING WITH COLLUDING ATTACKERS
In this case, we consider a set of k colluding jammers J = j 1 , . . . , j k that can share any information among themselves immediately by any means of communication. There are several problems when collusion is possible. The first problem is that attackers can coherently lie about their proofs (i.e. hashed content of jammed packets) to create "fake" R-alibis. To cope with this, we require at least k alibi = k + 1 witnesses presenting same hashed content of a jamming packet to create a R-alibi for all witnesses. k alibi is referred to as alibi threshold. The second problem is that attackers can share alibis. For example, let us consider the case of 2 colluding attackers. One attacker jams the network and the other attacker collects alibis. If there is no alibi-sharing, the jamming one can be detected by our previous proposed detection schemes. However, if alibis are shared to the jamming one, both attackers can get alibis at the rate of other normal nodes and thus cannot be detected. In what follows, we will discuss how to cope with colluding attackers using the concept of R-chains.
R-chains:
Consider an attacker j 1 who jams on channel c 1 ∈ C at time slot t. To limit the possibility that j 1 gets a shared alibi from another attacker j 2 (j 2 ∈ J \j 1 ) which correctly obtains an alibi on channel c 2 (c 2 ∈ C\c 1 ) at time slot t, we require j 1 has to be able to explain its presence on channel c 2 at time t. If j 1 's explanation can be verified, j 1 's alibi is valid. Thus, for a node to be able to explain its presence at time slot t on channel c ∈ C, it has to declare its sequence of being R-defendant before time slot t. Let us denote R-chain(i,s,l) the sequence of l pairs (c 1 , s) ...(c l , s + l − 1) in which node i becomes an R-defendant on channel c x at time slot s + x − 1 (x = 1..l). Thus, R-chain(i,s,l) can be used to verify the validity of any R-alibi for node i at any time in between [s, s + l − 1]. In other words, node G will only generate an R-alibi for a node i at time slot t on channel c if and only if 1) it receives R-chain(i,s,l) before time slot t and 2) the pair (c, t) exists in the chain R-chain(i,s,l) .
R-chain can drastically reduce the possibility of alibisharing behaviors of the attackers. Essentially, any two attackers j 1 and j 2 can share an R-alibi at time slot t on channel c only when (c, t) exists in both R-chain(j 1 ,t 1 ,l) and R-chain(j 2 ,t 2 ,l) . Thus, if all nodes (including attackers) are required to declare their R-chains before trying to obtain any R-alibis, the attackers cannot share alibis arbitrarily anymore. Unfortunately, if R-chain of an honest node is known by the attackers, the node is vulnerable to slander attacks. Basically, attackers can deterministically avoid jamming on channel c at time t if (c, t) is in the R-chains of victim nodes. Thus, victim nodes will not be able to get any R-alibis. To cope with the slander attacks, R-chains need to have certain randomness, which will be discussed next.
One-way R-chains: The basic idea to introduce randomness into an R-chain while still making it verifiable is based on the concept of one-way chains. One-way chains are widely used cryptographic primitive such as in Tesla [12] . A one-way chain is generated based on a one-way hash function F . To generate a one-way chain of length l, we first randomly pick the last element of the chain e l . Then, we generate the whole chain by repeatedly applying the function F l times (i.e. e l−1 = F (s l ), e l−2 = F (e l−1 ) and so on). Finally, e 0 is the commitment to the entire one-way chain. e 0 can always be used to verify whether an element belongs to the chain i.e., any e i belongs to a chain if and only if F i (s i ) = e 0 . The chain is released in the order from e 0 to e l .
There are several key properties of one-way chain that will be used to solve our problem. First, each element e i in the oneway chain can be considered as a random value uniformly drawn from the output space of one-way hash function F . Second, once the first element of the chain e 0 is released to the network, any later element of the chain e i (i > 0) cannot be changed and can be verified by checking whether F i (e i ) = e 0 . Third, due to the property of one-way hash function F , the knowledge of element e i does not reveal any information about e j for any j > i. Lastly, elements of a one-way chain have to be generated by applying the pre-selected one-way hash function F and cannot be generated arbitrarily.
In our alibi framework, a one-way chain is used to generate a one-way R-chain as follows. Time is divided into epochs of l time slots. An R-chain has a length of l. Each node generates its R-chain at the beginning of each epoch. To generate an R-chain of length l, a node i randomly selects a value s t at time t, node j will get an R-alibi. Furthermore, if node j shares this alibi to node i, they can achieve both jamming and collecting alibis at the same time. That means such a pair of attackers that colludes in the way just described is undetectable under the one-way R-alibi scheme. We refer to this strategy as safe-jam strategy. The success of the safe-jam strategy depends on the threshold k alibi that the number of witnesses on the same channel at the same time slot has to be greater than to get an R-alibi. The maximum value of k alibi is (k + 1) because there are k attackers. Smaller value of k alibi will make both the honest nodes and the attackers to get alibis easier. In our technical report [11] , we show that the upper bound of the expected number of channels jammed under safe-jam strategy is
VI. EVALUATION
Simulation Setup: We evaluate the proposed protocols in TOSSIM. SSCH is implemented by modifying the existing MAC. Each node has 4 channel seeds (similar to the implementation in [3] ). Each channel seed can be either "sending", "receiving" or "idle". A node only becomes a witness in the time slots where one of its idle channel seeds is used. There are n/2 CBR traffic flows established randomly and uniformly between pairs of nodes. In a CBR flow, the sender will send a data packet to the selected receiver in every 100ms. In the simulation, all jammers use the same jamming probability p jam . The simulation parameters are listed in Table I . In each scenario, we calculate the average detection probability, average false alarm rate, average detection time and packet 2 Note that the imprecision of the probability comes from the ceiling operation but can be provably bounded by
. error rate. We also repeat each scenario 10 times to get the confident statistics.
Simulation Results: Figures 3 and 4 show the performance of the proposed system for the case of non-colluding attackers. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the results in which the network size is varied from 10 to 40 and the jamming probability of all attackers are set to 0.6. Figure 3(a) shows that the detection probability increases when the network size increases. This is because more nodes with more traffic will give create more chances for honest nodes to get alibis. Figure 3 (a) also shows that more attackers will make it harder to identify them, especially those with low jamming probability. This is because when there are more attackers, any attacker with low jamming probability can have more chances to get alibis from the other attackers' jamming actions. Figure 3(b) shows that the false alarm rate is maintained within the expected false alarm rate γ. Figure 3 (c) further shows the detection time which can be similarly explained as in Figure3(a). Figure 3(d) shows the average packet loss. As the number of attackers increase, the packet loss rate also increases. Figure 4 shows the results in which the network size n is set to 40 and the jamming probability p jam is varied from 0.1 to 1.0. Figure 4(a) shows the detection probability of the proposed system. The detection probability increases when the jamming rate increases. This behavior shows the correctness of the principle of alibis: the more the attackers jam, the easier to detect them. It also shows that more attackers will make it harder to identify them, especially those with low jamming probability. This is because when there are more attackers, any attacker with low jamming probability can have more chances to get alibis from the other attackers' jamming actions. For attackers with high jamming probability, there will be no difference because they are always busy jamming. Figure 3 
VII. RELATED WORK
There has been plethora body of research work on jamming attacks and defenses. Jamming attacks can be classified as proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming strategy, the attacker jams the channel without caring about the on-going communication (e.g. continuous jamming [8] [13] ). In reactive jamming strategy, the attackers only jam when they detect on-going communication on the targeted channels [13] [19] . They may jam "important" packets such as control packets because corrupted control packets can drastically reduce the effective throughput of the communication channel [17] [18] .
Due to the dangers of various jamming attacks, jamming defenses have gained much attention from researchers. One of the most effective jamming mitigation is the spread spectrum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency (frequencyhopping spread spectrum -FHSS) or spreading its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum -DSSS), the network can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than if spread spectrum were not used [1] . However, the spread spectrum does not work if jammers know the hopping-pattern (HP) of FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN) sequence of DSSS. Once the attacker knows such knowledge, he can jam the channel very effectively. For example, in 802.11 DSSS the PN is a common knowledge and the attacker can easily obtain it. By just using the COTS 802.11 cards, the attacker can 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE easily modify the firmware to have an effective 802.11 jammer [13] . That said, the "outsider" attack (i.e., no knowledge of the HP or PN) can be defended effectively with spread spectrum technology while the "insider" attack is still a problem.
Indeed, dealing with the insider-based attacks, where the "shared secret" such as shared HP or PN is compromised, is a challenging problem. In [20] , the authors proposed a tree of shared secrets of single shared secret to identify compromised nodes. This idea is an extension from the well-known hierarchical key management. Recently, there have been proposals of zero-shared knowledge communication under the jamming situation by using concurrent code [21] , uncoordinated FHSS [10] [22] and zero shared-secret DSSS [23] [24] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have shown how the alibi framework copes with the insider-based jammers. The framework is built from the core concept of "alibi", a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Even though started from such a simple concept, alibi framework has to deal with various challenging scenarios such as lossy channels, noncolluding multiple attackers and colluding multiple attackers. We have shown detailed study of properties of alibi framework including accuracy, detection time and network performance, by both simulation and analysis. The overall results show promising research direction of alibi framework to cope with insider-based jamming attacks.
